Silver Fox delivered ValleyRAT through signed adware that users whitelist themselves
Kaspersky traced one submitted installer to a modified Chinese wallpaper tool whose signed executable sideloads a malicious libcef.dll, and the same installer switches Windows Defender off before it ever runs.
The Watch · Security desk
What happened
- A Kaspersky client submitted installer MD5 c24e99f9437feacaa63766a3cde3fe3d for detection; it was first classified as adware, then found to run an infection chain that delivers the ValleyRAT backdoor.
- The installer plants a modified copy of QN Wallpaper and starts its signed executable, which loads a malicious libcef.dll from the same directory so the backdoor executes inside a trusted, signed process.
- Kaspersky attributes the activity to Silver Fox on geography and payload, and lists command-and-control at 103.45.66.18 on ports 441, 442 and 443 and 192.253.225.173 on ports 6666 and 8888.
- Cato Networks documented Silver Fox abusing legitimate applications for DLL sideloading at a Japanese manufacturer about five weeks earlier, and the libcef.dll filename appeared in a 2025 ValleyRAT loader.
Why it matters
- Who's exposed exposure Any endpoint whose owner excluded this wallpaper tool to keep its features working is reachable by the full backdoor, and the resulting activity reads in logs as approved, signed software behaving normally.
- What it costs cost Killing the process triggers a blue screen because it's flagged critical, so eviction takes more than a kill, and each infected host becomes a scheduled outage instead of a remote cleanup.
- What it limits constraint Signer-based and path-based allowlisting cannot separate this build from the real tool, which pushes detection onto what a signed process loads at runtime rather than who signed the executable.
- What doesn't add up contradiction Kaspersky presents the whitelisting habit as the likely motive, but the same installer also disables Defender outright, so the exclusion list only makes the operator's job easier, without being something the infection depends on.
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The sideloaded library keeps the wallpaper tool from working. Every function libcef.dll exports is placed into an infinite sleep, so neither QnWallpaper.exe nor QnwPlayer.exe does what the original program exists to do, and the sample's advertising features stay inert while the infection chain runs [10][6]. Kaspersky notes a fallback: if that sleep is ever interrupted, the code loads the genuine library's functions into memory, provided it can find the original on the system [10]. This build never delivers on the pretext an administrator relies on when whitelisting software like this: keeping its useful features from being blocked [19].
Malicious execution begins in DllMain when the library loads [11]. A second entry point, an export named RunDLL, is present and never called by QnWallpaper; Kaspersky's reading is that the operators intended to invoke it by hand through rundll32, or through an executable that was not in the downloaded package [11]. Once running, the code checks whether the current user is in the Administrators group and relaunches with runas if not, then selects its payload by host process: a file called PeLoader inside QnWallpaper.exe, a resource in libcef.dll itself inside QnwPlayer.exe [12][13].
Sequencing is what complicates the exclusion-list story. Persistence lands first, through autorun entries for the wallpaper tool plus a file extension association and a matching file dropped in the Startup folder [7][20]. The installer then writes DisableAntiSpyware and only afterwards starts the signed binary [1]. Elevation via runas happens later still, inside the loaded DLL [12]. That Defender write is redundant on a host where the install directory is already excluded, but on any other host it removes the need for the operator to rely on user hygiene.
The scale figures are annual rather than campaign-specific. Kaspersky recorded more than 100,000 detections of ValleyRAT and associated malware across 2026 against more than 1,500 unique users, mostly in China and India, spanning all of the year's activity rather than this route [26]. Taking both floors at face value gives roughly 67 detections per affected user [25]. That ratio is what affiliate and ad-network distribution looks like from the detection side: the same loaders arriving repeatedly at the same machines. The adware route carries no victim count of its own, and the analysis rests on a single installer submitted by a customer [16].
The packaging points at volume rather than a named target. The installer varies its behaviour according to the two-letter suffix in its filename, which Kaspersky reads as misdirection, and the chain opens meeting.tencent.com as a decoy page [21][23]. Kaspersky tracked the same group in an earlier tax-themed campaign against organisations in India and Russia, a different wrapper around the same loading trick [18].
What to watch
- Whether a later sample actually calls the unused RunDLL export, which would expose a stage missing from this package.
- Whether other signed utilities distributed from keansoft.cn get repackaged the same way.
- Whether Kaspersky or anyone else attaches a victim count to the adware delivery route rather than to ValleyRAT overall.
Clarity's read
What the record supports and how the coverage leans. The claims behind it follow.
Reality
- Evidence72
- Adoption
- Not scored
- Hype gap+15
- Incentives30
- Confidence66
Perspective Coverage
4 publishers- Builder
- Builder 24%
- Operator
- Operator 67%
- Investor
- Investor 9%
Claim ledger
Ranked by verification strength, evidence, and original report placement.
- [1]
After unpacking, the installer uses the DisableAntiSpyware registry key to disable Windows Defender and then launches QnWallpaper.exe.
- [2]
The threat actor known as Silver Fox has been observed distributing the ValleyRAT backdoor disguised as a signed Chinese adware application, running the malware under a trusted process to slip past users who add such software to their antivirus exclusions.
- [3]
Kaspersky said the attack's geography and payload point to Silver Fox as the likely group behind it.
- [4]
ValleyRAT, also tracked as Winos 4.0, hands the operator full control of the compromised machine.
- [5]
A client asked Kaspersky to analyse a file with MD5 hash c24e99f9437feacaa63766a3cde3fe3d and add it to the detection database; it was initially classified as adware, but suspicious network activity prompted deeper analysis, which found it triggers an infection chain delivering the ValleyRAT backdoor.
- [6]
The sample's advertising functionality does not even work; instead it triggers the infection chain.
- [7]
Regardless of the file name, the installer deploys a modified Chinese desktop wallpaper management tool called QN Wallpaper (qnwallpaper[.]keansoft[.]cn) and adds it to the registry's autorun entries; the original version is genuine adware that delivers bundled partner apps and displays ad banners.
- [8]
The QN Wallpaper modules and malicious components are unpacked to C:\Program Files\QNWallpaper\5.4.0.1662\<random string of letters and digits>.
- [9]
QnWallpaper.exe has dependencies in libcef.dll, so the library is loaded when the process starts; QnWallpaper.exe also launches QnwPlayer.exe, which likewise calls libcef.dll. With the library executing inside a legitimately signed process, the backdoor runs without triggering controls that trust the signature.
- [10]
QnWallpaper and QnwPlayer will not function correctly because the functions exported from libcef.dll are put into an infinite sleep; in case that sleep is ever interrupted, the attackers implemented a function that loads all necessary functions from the original library into memory, provided it can locate that library on the system.
- [11]
The malicious functionality in libcef.dll is invoked by a call to DllMain, which runs automatically when the library is loaded; the library also contains an export named RunDLL that also initiates the malicious code and that QnWallpaper never calls. Kaspersky suspects the attackers intended to invoke it manually via rundll32 or planned to use a separate executable not included in the downloaded package.
- [12]
Inside the function Kaspersky calls mw_entry, the malware checks whether the current user belongs to the Administrators group and which process the DLL is running inside; if the user is not an Administrators member, it attempts to obtain administrator privileges using the runas utility.
- [13]
Once it has administrator privileges, the code selects the payload by host process: loaded from the PeLoader file when running inside QnWallpaper.exe, and from a libcef.dll resource when running inside QnwPlayer.exe.
- [14]
ValleyRAT can flag its own process as critical, so that any attempt to terminate it triggers a blue screen of death.
- [15]
Kaspersky said ValleyRAT is a sophisticated backdoor capable of collecting sensitive data such as keystrokes and clipboard contents, taking screenshots, and delivering additional malicious modules.
- [16]
Kaspersky's account is based on a single installer submitted by a customer, and the report stops short of attaching a victim count to the adware route.
- [17]
In a campaign against a Japanese manufacturer about five weeks earlier, Cato Networks documented what it called Silver Fox's newly observed abuse of legitimate applications for DLL sideloading, and the same libcef.dll filename had already featured in a 2025 ValleyRAT loader.
- [18]
Kaspersky tracked the same group in an earlier tax-themed campaign against organizations in India and Russia.
- [19]
The attackers may have chosen this distribution method because the adware was signed by the developer, and because users often manually add these apps to exclusions so their useful features do not get blocked.
- [20]
When the library is loaded, code runs that ensures QnWallpaper.exe persists at startup by adding a file extension association and dropping a file with the corresponding extension in the user's Start Menu Programs Startup directory.
- [21]
The installer performed different actions depending on the two-letter suffix used in the file name, positioned just before the numeric string; these actions are most likely designed to divert the user's attention away from the malicious functionality.
- [22]
Kaspersky listed command-and-control servers 103.45.66.18 on ports 441, 442 and 443, and 192.253.225.173 on ports 6666 and 8888.
- [23]
Domains in the chain include qnwallpaper[.]keansoft[.]cn, the abused adware's download site, and meeting[.]tencent[.]com, a legitimate page opened as a decoy.
- [24]
Kaspersky urged users to avoid installing software of questionable reputation and never to add such software to security solutions' exclusion lists, and urged organisations to set clear policies on third-party software on work devices.
- [25]
Taking Kaspersky's two 2026 floors at face value gives roughly 67 detections per affected user.
- [26]
Across 2026 Kaspersky recorded more than 100,000 detections of ValleyRAT and associated malware affecting over 1,500 unique users, mostly in China and India, a figure spanning all of the year's ValleyRAT activity rather than this campaign alone.
Sources
4 independent publishers whose own reporting we read for this story.
- scworld.comSilver Fox uses adware to distribute ValleyRAT backdoor
1 article · September 1, 2026
- securelist.comValleyRAT masquerading as adware
1 article · August 31, 2026
- securityaffairs.comValleyRAT: When Legitimate Software Becomes a Malware Delivery Tool
1 article · August 31, 2026
- thehackernews.comValleyRAT Backdoor Hides in Signed Adware That Users Add to Antivirus Exclusions
1 article · August 31, 2026