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Screening Xinbi's 52 blocked addresses catches about 35% of the $24bn Treasury counted

OFAC listed the Xinbi marketplace and two software developers on September 9, with 52 TRON addresses that Chainalysis says received more than $8.4bn in stablecoins against Treasury's $24bn count for the platform.

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Illustration accompanying Screening Xinbi's 52 blocked addresses catches about 35% of the $24bn Treasury counted
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What happened

  • The Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control listed the Xinbi marketplace as a significant transnational criminal organization on September 9, 2026.
  • Two software firms went on the list with it: Cambodia-based Anwen Technology, which built the XinbiPay wallet also marketed as NewPay, and Singapore-based SafeW Technology, behind the encrypted SafeW app.
  • The Justice Department's Scam Center Strike Force seized related infrastructure and digital asset wallets the same day, and Telegram banned Xinbi.
  • Treasury put processed value at more than $24bn in digital assets and fiat since about 2022, while TRM Labs estimates more than $36bn of throughput and about $17bn of inflows.
  • Xinbi ran escrow, holding a buyer's payment until a seller delivered stolen personal data, forged identity documents, deepfake tools, satellite gear or unlicensed cash-out services.

Why it matters

  • Who's exposed exposure Civil penalties here can apply on a strict-liability basis, and the 50 percent rule pulls in any company majority-owned by a blocked person. A platform that keeps processing linked flows is liable without intent.
  • What it limits constraint The blocked addresses are all on TRON while XinbiPay supported USDT on three chains: a desk that screens only the listed TRON addresses is covering one of three settlement paths.
  • What doesn't add up contradiction Treasury's count is about two-thirds of TRM Labs' estimate, a $12bn gap, so a firm reconstructing its historical exposure to these rails has no single denominator to work from.
  • What it sets up precedent Each takedown so far has moved demand to the next guarantee market. The next OFAC package will be judged on whether it names wallets, apps and escrow together instead of one storefront.

The 52 blocked TRON addresses received more than $8.4bn of stablecoins, which is about 35 percent of the more than $24bn Treasury attributes to the marketplace since about 2022, and about 23 percent of TRM Labs' $36bn throughput estimate [16][4][15][25][26]. That averages roughly $161m an address [27].

Velocity is the part the totals hide. XinbiPay's withdrawal hot wallet took in $94.6m in December 2025, according to TRM Labs [18]. Twelve months at that rate is about $1.14bn [29]. Treasury's $24bn spread across roughly four and a half years averages about $5.3bn a year, so one hot wallet in one month was moving at about a fifth of the lifetime pace [30]. December was near a peak: TRM reported that daily inflows nearly doubled between May and December 2025 [20].

The growth came from enforcement elsewhere. After FinCEN targeted Huione Pay as a primary money laundering concern, and after Telegram restrictions and earlier crackdowns hit Huione, Haowang and Tudou Guarantee, a large share of remaining volume migrated to Xinbi [19]. Much of the demand sits in the Golden Triangle across Myanmar, Thailand and Laos, in compounds that have used trafficked workers lured by false job offers [21].

The flows are not only fraud proceeds. Treasury said North Korean-linked actors and previously designated groups, including entities associated with the Prince Group and Jin Bei Group, used Xinbi [9]. Chainalysis reported that DPRK-linked wallets moved tens of millions of dollars from major exchange thefts, including the Bybit and WazirX hacks, through Xinbi vendors that swapped tainted coins for cleaner stablecoins [10].

The two software listings look more consequential than the storefront designation. Around June 2025, facing rising scrutiny, Xinbi pushed merchants onto SafeW and launched the no-KYC XinbiPay wallet [7], and Treasury designated those developers to hit the fallback infrastructure, not only the public storefront [8]. The counter-case is timing. Britain designated Xinbi in March 2026, about six months before OFAC [11][23], and the platform was still running with infrastructure left to seize when the US action landed [24].

If a successor guarantee market posts the same near-doubling of daily inflows within six months of September 9 while settlement stays concentrated in USDT on TRON [17][20], then listing a wallet developer and a messaging developer did not raise the cost of rebuilding, and the address block was the whole of the action.

What to watch

  • Whether OFAC extends the list beyond the initial 52 addresses or names further wallet and messaging developers in Cambodia and Singapore.
  • Whether the Justice Department seizure produces named defendants, which would put evidence behind the throughput estimates.
  • Whether TRM Labs and Chainalysis revise their Xinbi figures now that the designated addresses are public.

Information, not investment advice. This story is general information about companies and markets, drawn from cited reporting. It is not a recommendation to buy, sell or hold any security; check the cited sources before acting.

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What the record supports and how the coverage leans. The claims behind it follow.

Reality

Evidence71
Adoption62
Hype gap+15
Incentives62
Confidence68
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  1. [1]

    On September 9, 2026, the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control listed the Xinbi platform as a significant transnational criminal organization.

    Reported Supported Source: crowdfundinsider.comView cited source
  2. [2]

    OFAC also designated two firms that built tools around Xinbi: Cambodia-based Anwen Technology, developer of the XinbiPay wallet also marketed as NewPay, and Singapore-based SafeW Technology, creator of the encrypted SafeW messaging app.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  3. [3]

    The same day, the Justice Department's Scam Center Strike Force seized related infrastructure and digital asset wallets, and Telegram banned Xinbi.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  4. [4]

    Treasury said the marketplace has, since about 2022, processed the equivalent of more than $24 billion in digital assets and fiat, mostly across Southeast Asia.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  5. [5]

    Xinbi operated as an escrow guarantee service linking scam-compound operators with vendors selling stolen personal data, forged identity documents, deepfake tools, satellite internet gear, unlicensed over-the-counter cash-out services and custom fake brokerage websites.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  6. [6]

    After a buyer paid, Xinbi held funds until the seller delivered, an arrangement that lowered friction for criminal counterparties who would otherwise struggle to trust one another.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  7. [7]

    Around June 2025, facing rising scrutiny, Xinbi pushed merchants onto SafeW and launched the no-KYC XinbiPay wallet supporting USDT on TRC-20, ERC-20 and BEP-20.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  8. [8]

    Designating those developers was meant to hit that fallback infrastructure, not only the public storefront.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  9. [9]

    Treasury said North Korean-linked actors and previously designated groups, including entities associated with the Prince Group and Jin Bei Group, used Xinbi.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  10. [10]

    Chainalysis reported that DPRK-linked wallets moved tens of millions of dollars from major exchange thefts, including the Bybit and WazirX hacks, through Xinbi vendors that swapped tainted coins for cleaner stablecoins.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  11. [11]

    The US action follows a UK designation of Xinbi in March 2026 and earlier US measures against the Prince Group and Huione.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  12. [12]

    Property of the designated parties in the United States or controlled by US persons is blocked and must be reported; any company owned 50 percent or more by blocked persons is also blocked; US persons generally cannot deal with them, and civil penalties can apply on a strict-liability basis.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  13. [13]

    Platforms that continue to process flows linked to Xinbi, XinbiPay, SafeW or the listed wallets now face sanctions exposure even if the original Telegram shopfront is gone.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  14. [14]

    Fifty-two TRON addresses were added to the Specially Designated Nationals list.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  15. [15]

    TRM Labs estimates more than $36 billion in throughput and about $17 billion in inflows for Xinbi.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  16. [16]

    Chainalysis notes that the 52 designated addresses alone received more than $8.4 billion in stablecoins.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  17. [17]

    Xinbi settlements have been concentrated in USDT on TRON.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  18. [18]

    XinbiPay's withdrawal hot wallet took in $94.6 million in December 2025, according to TRM Labs.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  19. [19]

    After FinCEN targeted Huione Pay as a primary money laundering concern, and after Telegram restrictions and earlier crackdowns hit Huione, Haowang and Tudou Guarantee, a large share of remaining volume migrated to Xinbi.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  20. [20]

    TRM Labs reported that Xinbi's daily inflows nearly doubled between May and December 2025.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  21. [21]

    Investigators place much of this activity in the Golden Triangle spanning Myanmar, Thailand and Laos, with compounds that have used trafficked workers lured by false job offers.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  22. [22]

    The source notes a pattern: when one guarantee market is dismantled, another absorbs the demand unless the wallets, apps and escrow rails are targeted together.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  23. [23]

    The UK designation in March 2026 preceded the OFAC listing of September 9, 2026 by about six months.

    Derived Supported
  24. [24]

    Xinbi was still operating after the March 2026 UK designation, since the Justice Department had infrastructure and wallets left to seize on September 9, 2026.

    Derived Supported
  25. [25]

    The $8.4bn received by the 52 designated addresses is about 35 percent of Treasury's $24bn figure for the marketplace.

    Derived Supported
  26. [26]

    The $8.4bn received by the 52 designated addresses is about 23 percent of TRM Labs' $36bn throughput estimate.

    Derived Supported
  27. [27]

    Across 52 designated addresses, $8.4bn averages roughly $161m an address.

    Derived Supported
  28. [28]

    Treasury's $24bn count is about two-thirds of TRM Labs' $36bn throughput estimate, a gap of $12bn.

    Derived Supported
  29. [29]

    December 2025's $94.6m of XinbiPay hot wallet inflows, run for twelve months, is about $1.14bn a year.

    Derived Supported
  30. [30]

    Treasury's $24bn across roughly four and a half years to September 2026 averages about $5.3bn a year, so the annualised $1.14bn from one hot wallet is about a fifth of that pace.

    Derived Supported
  31. [31]

    Fifty-two designated addresses are TRON addresses, while the XinbiPay wallet supported USDT on TRC-20, ERC-20 and BEP-20, so two of the three supported chains carry no listed addresses.

    Derived Supported

Sources

2 independent publishers whose own reporting we read for this story.

  1. cointelegraph.com

    1 article · September 9, 2026

    US sanctions Xinbi scam marketplace, restrains $52M in crypto
  2. crowdfundinsider.com

    1 article · September 11, 2026

    Southeast Asia’s Illicit Crypto Marketplace Xinbi Sanctioned by US Authorities

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