Breeze Comet talks its way into Brazilian payment systems with a help-desk call and AnyDesk
Google Threat Intelligence and Mandiant put the Brazilian crew's route to Pix and STR at password spraying plus a fake IT support call, which means the controls that bite here are RMM allow-listing and out-of-band verification of the help desk.
The Watch · Security desk

What happened
- Initial access comes from password spraying plus voice calls impersonating IT support that persuade the target to install a remote monitoring and management tool such as AnyDesk.
- Compromised small Brazilian government websites host the RMM installers, XWorm and infostealers disguised as tax or receipt documents, and double as command-and-control endpoints.
- The actor has executed hundreds of fraudulent transactions through Brazilian payment systems, with at least one heist worth tens of thousands of dollars.
Why it matters
- Who has to decide decision Patch cycles buy almost nothing against this actor, so the spend moves to deny-by-default remote access tooling and a help-desk process where verification runs on a channel the caller did not pick.
- Who's exposed exposure Any firm holding RSFN access or transacting on Pix, STR and Boleto is now the reachable path for an actor that cannot get licensed itself, which puts fintech and banking software suppliers in scope as someone else's entry point.
- What it limits constraint Detection built around persistence artifacts and outbound domain reputation loses its grip when the tunnel rides WebSocket through the firewall and the payloads are served from government hosts.
- What it sets up precedent The same staging pattern already appearing in Nigeria, Paraguay, Ghana and Venezuela sets up other instant-payment systems to be worked the same way, without the operators needing new tradecraft.
Next story · Security · 4h ago
Attackers pushed a backdoor through AOMEI Backupper's update servers in windows of 5 to 10 minutesConfirmed2 publishers
The voice call is the intrusion. Password spraying supplies a working credential, the call supplies the remote session, and after the operator installs AnyDesk the attacker is typing on a trusted endpoint [4]. Axur's November 2025 case ran the same pretext over WhatsApp and finished with the victim executing a PowerShell reconnaissance script, presented as an application update [5]. Neither step involves a flaw in software, and the only entry route Google documents that does is the web shell dropped on vulnerable JBoss AS servers, so exactly one of the two documented routes is patchable [6][20].
Google's four preconditions for a fraudulent transfer say the same thing in the actor's own terms: access to the National Financial System Network through an entity that already holds it, mTLS credentials that can sign transactional payloads to Pix or STR, several accounts across Active Directory and cloud, and an understanding of how the target actually processes transfers and screens fraud [16]. Three of the four are credential and access problems and the fourth is homework [21]. The actor does not need to be an RSFN participant; it needs to be inside one [16].
That is why the AnyDesk install and the help-desk phone line are the control surface. Allow-list remote access binaries and deny by default, because the staging is designed to beat reputation: GTIG describes RMM installers, infostealers dressed as tax or receipt documents, and XWorm hosted on compromised small Brazilian government sites that also serve as C2 [8]. A domain block list does not help when the download comes from a .gov.br host. On the voice side, the verification has to run on a channel the caller did not choose, meaning a callback to a number the employee looks up and a ticket that exists before the install, not after.
Lateral movement is built to survive the hunt for persistence. COBALTSPIN, a Rust tunneler, opens a reverse SOCKS5 proxy over WebSocket and routes traffic between C2 and internal targets through boundary firewalls, which Google notes removes the need for built-in persistence mechanisms that might trigger detection [11][12]. Internal reconnaissance uses Impacket, ADRecon, ADVipscan and a custom LDAP brute-forcer called REALBREEZE against development and cloud environments [10]. In retail, the crew has skipped the network path entirely and plugged rogue hardware into store networks [9].
The attribution is layered, and worth separating. GTIG and Mandiant track Breeze Comet, formerly UNC5669, against Brazilian financial services, retail and e-commerce since 2024 [1]. CrowdStrike's Plump Spider and Trend Micro's SHADOW-AETHER-064 are described as overlapping clusters [14], with CrowdStrike dating the Brazil-based group to September 2023 [15]. That earliest vendor date sits at least four months before the window Google gives [19]. Documented loss so far is at least one heist worth tens of thousands of dollars [3] across hundreds of fraudulent transactions [13].
What to watch
- Whether GTIG ties the Nigeria, Paraguay, Ghana and Venezuela staging sites to actual intrusions rather than infrastructure alone.
- Whether an RSFN participant or a banking software supplier discloses a fraudulent Pix or STR transfer traced to stolen mTLS credentials.
- Whether CrowdStrike, Trend Micro and Google formally merge Plump Spider, SHADOW-AETHER-064 and Breeze Comet into one named group.
Clarity's read
What the record supports and how the coverage leans. The claims behind it follow.
Reality
- Evidence50
- Adoption
- Not scored
- Hype gap+10
- Incentives
- Not scored
- Confidence55
Claim ledger
Ranked by verification strength, evidence, and original report placement.
- [1]
Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) and Mandiant track a financially motivated actor dubbed Breeze Comet, formerly UNC5669, targeting Brazilian financial services, retail and e-commerce organizations since 2024.
- [2]
GTIG and Mandiant describe Breeze Comet as "specializing in manipulating payment systems and banking software in Brazil to conduct fraudulent transfers."
- [3]
The actor is said to have successfully carried out at least one heist of assets worth tens of thousands of U.S. dollars.
- [4]
Initial access to financial entities is accomplished via password spraying and voice calls impersonating IT support teams to persuade targets to install Remote Monitoring and Management tools such as AnyDesk.
- [5]
In a case highlighted by Axur in November 2025, the actors posed as IT support personnel over a WhatsApp conversation and guided the victim to install a PowerShell reconnaissance script under the pretext of updating a corporate application.
- [6]
Alternatively the group has targeted vulnerable JBoss AS servers to deploy web shells, then used them to deliver Chisel and other proxy utilities for follow-on exploitation.
- [7]
Primary targets are organizations with permission to conduct transactions through banking software, APIs and payment systems such as Pix, STR and Boleto, including banks, payment processors, retailers, exchanges, fintech firms and banking software providers.
- [8]
The actor uses compromised Brazilian small government websites to stage RMM tools, infostealers dressed up as legitimate tax or receipt documents and backdoors such as XWorm, and as C2 endpoints to bypass reputation filters; a similar approach has been replicated across Nigeria, Paraguay, Ghana and Venezuela.
- [9]
The group has connected rogue hardware devices directly into retail store networks to establish footholds, then downloaded Netcat and custom scripts to retrieve post-exploitation frameworks.
- [10]
Internal reconnaissance and privilege escalation use Impacket, ADRecon, ADVipscan and a custom LDAP brute-forcing utility called REALBREEZE, targeting development and cloud environments.
- [11]
Lateral movement uses unauthorized RDP sessions and command execution over SMB shares, and includes deployment of COBALTSPIN, a Rust-based routing malware acting as a network tunneler to maintain persistent access to financial API infrastructure.
- [12]
Google says COBALTSPIN establishes a reverse SOCKS5 proxy over a WebSocket connection to route traffic between C2 and internal targets, enabling lateral movement through boundary firewalls without built-in persistence mechanisms that might trigger detection.
- [13]
Breeze Comet has executed hundreds of fraudulent transactions via Brazilian payment systems.
- [14]
The activity overlaps with clusters tracked by CrowdStrike as Plump Spider and by Trend Micro as SHADOW-AETHER-064.
- [15]
According to CrowdStrike, the e-crime group operates out of Brazil, has been active since September 2023, and monetizes intrusions by gaining unauthorized access to internal payment systems and carrying out fraudulent transactions.
- [16]
Google lists four requirements the actor must meet: access to the National Financial System Network (RSFN) through an entity that already has it; mTLS credentials allowing authenticated payloads with transactional orders to Pix or STR; access to several accounts in the target's Active Directory and cloud environments; and an understanding of the organization's transfer processing procedures, network controls, fintech integrations and anti-fraud systems.
- [17]
Google says Breeze Comet tactics have evolved to leverage a customized malware suite and compromised, trusted websites for initial access, C2, and interaction with financial software and payment APIs.
- [18]
Google says Breeze Comet's operational infrastructure may indicate intent to expand its infrastructure footprint to other countries in Latin America and Africa.
- [19]
CrowdStrike's start date for the group precedes the earliest possible month of Google's stated targeting window by at least four months.
- [20]
Of the two initial access routes documented for Breeze Comet, one requires a vulnerable server and one requires none.
- [21]
Three of Google's four preconditions for a fraudulent transfer are access or credential requirements and the fourth is procedural knowledge; none require a software vulnerability.
Sources
2 independent publishers whose own reporting we read for this story.
- scworld.comBreeze Comet threat actor targets Brazilian financial sector with sophisticated attacks
1 article · September 2, 2026
- thehackernews.comBreeze Comet Executes Hundreds of Fraudulent Transactions via Brazilian Payment Systems
1 article · September 1, 2026
Topics and entities
Topics
- Legitimate RMM Abuse
- Latin American cybercrime
- Help-desk impersonation
- Payment system fraud
Entities
- AnyDesk
- Google Threat Intelligence Group
- National Financial System Network (RSFN)
- Pix
- Trend Micro
- CrowdStrike
- Mandiant