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Topic

Remote management tool abuse

Attackers' use of legitimate remote monitoring and management tools (e.g. ScreenConnect, MSP360, ManageEngine) for persistence and control after compromise.

Current stories

securityOne report1 publisher

Phishers use a fake report on Microsoft's Power BI domain to deliver rogue ScreenConnect clients

Huntress tied one rogue ScreenConnect configuration from a Power BI phishing campaign to 22 more endpoints across separate incidents. For defenders, the thing to hunt is a ScreenConnect client their own IT never deployed.

Publishers:huntress.com

Reality

Evidence62
Adoption12
Hype gap0
Incentives
Not scored
Confidence60
securityOne report1 publisher

Attackers used legitimate remote management tools in 45% of endpoint incidents Huntress logged

Huntress found legitimate remote management software abused in 45% of the endpoint incidents it logged in the first quarter of 2026. A rogue copy can behave like IT's approved one, so defenders have to know which tools are sanctioned and how each install arrived.

Reality

Evidence45
Adoption55
Hype gap+5
Incentives
Not scored
Confidence55
securityOne report1 publisher

Attackers are phishing employees into installing rogue ITarian and ScreenConnect clients

Huntress says three of its SOC investigations began with document lures and ended with victims installing rogue ITarian and ScreenConnect clients, and its responders now find RMM abuse in almost 40% of the incidents they work.

Publishers:huntress.com

Reality

Evidence45
Adoption50
Hype gap+20
Incentives78
Confidence48
buildOne report1 publisher

Spring Ring stands up an onmicrosoft.com tenant to place the IT help-desk call

Unit 42 traced two campaigns that open with a Teams chat and an immediate voice call from an external tenant, which puts the question of who can ring your staff in the same bucket as who can sign in as them.

Publishers:dev.to

Reality

Evidence42
Adoption27
Hype gap+9
Incentives58
Confidence46
buildOne report1 publisher

TA4922 parks Donut Loader in the same folder as a signed executable

Proofpoint's PackClient writeup describes a chain whose only attacker-supplied executable on disk is a DLL, and whose persistence arrives as a real ManageEngine agent. That leaves the detection sitting on load-event correlation and egress control.

Publishers:dev.to

Reality

Evidence36
Adoption31
Hype gap+14
Incentives57
Confidence41