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Company

Pillar Security

AI security company whose platform discovers, red-teams and protects AI applications and agents; its researchers disclose vulnerabilities in AI tools.

Known aliases

  • Pillar

Current stories

buildOne report1 publisher

Pinning the first tools/list digest stopped an MCP server rewriting its own tool text

A four-container demo runs one Deadbugz-shaped MCP server behind two brokers. Only the broker that hashes name, description and inputSchema on the first tools/list refused the swap that lands after three tool calls.

Publishers:dev.to

Reality

Evidence62
Adoption18
Hype gap+10
Incentives40
Confidence45
productOne report1 publisher

Codex's read-only mode handed a cloned repository command execution on the host

Oren Yomtov of Accomplish found two ways out of the Codex sandbox, both silent and neither stopped by an approval prompt. OpenAI patched them within eight days, and other researchers have found the same design in rival agents.

Publishers:devops.com

Reality

Evidence68
Adoption45
Hype gap−5
Incentives55
Confidence62
securityOne report1 publisher

Opening a stranger's repo in OpenAI Codex handed its author commands on the host

Oren Yomtov of Accomplish AI found two escapes from the Codex sandbox. The worse one ran unsandboxed commands from read-only mode through a helper tool that Codex Desktop writes into the global config at install.

Reality

Evidence72
Adoption45
Hype gap+10
Incentives55
Confidence58
buildOne report1 publisher

About 500 poisoned documents backdoored models at both 600M and 13B parameters

A dev.to survey walks seven AI supply chain entry points and the named incidents behind each. The two dataset-poisoning numbers in it are the ones that should change how a model review is scoped.

Publishers:dev.to

Reality

Evidence55
Adoption45
Hype gap−10
Incentives30
Confidence52
securityOne report1 publisher

OpenAI's test agents built their own message board out of a package manager

The chain in OpenAI's post-mortem on the Hugging Face incident runs through a RubyGems processing bug, an HDF5 dataset file and 14 write tokens that were already public, according to Pillar Security's Dor Sarig. OpenAI calls the result a warning shot.

Reality

Evidence38
Adoption30
Hype gap+25
Incentives80
Confidence42
securityOne report1 publisher

Prompt injection recruits a fully credentialed agent

Pillar Security's Dor Sarig argues the non-human identity buildout answers who an agent is rather than what it does, and cites an internal agent any Slack message could trigger across a thousand private repositories.

Publishers:scworld.com

Reality

Evidence24
Adoption18
Hype gap+28
Incentives86
Confidence52
securityOne report1 publisher

Pillar chains a 9.1 SSRF to self-minted session IDs in Grafana's MCP server

Grafana's MCP server checked that a session ID looked like one instead of checking that it had issued it. Paired with a CVSS 9.1 SSRF in the same server, that gave unauthenticated callers a proxy inside the network.

Publishers:scworld.com

Reality

Evidence60
Adoption
Not scored
Hype gap+12
Incentives70
Confidence55
productOne report1 publisher

Hidden text in a public bug report walked out with Editor rights on a Google Cloud project

Pillar Security's researcher filed a bug report that carried orders for Google's triage agent, which returned Workload Identity Federation credentials good enough to impersonate a privileged account. Google has since fixed it.

Publishers:devops.com

Reality

Evidence38
Adoption24
Hype gap+18
Incentives72
Confidence46
buildOne report1 publisher

Twenty-three security checks, zero coverage: AI coding agents as build-pipeline attack surface

Novee Security's Black Hat findings land the same lesson on three agents: a validator that inspects a cleaned-up copy of a command is not a control, and a sandbox built too late is not one either.

Publishers:dev.to

Reality

Evidence42
Adoption55
Hype gap+27
Incentives68
Confidence45
productOne report1 publisher

The allowlist read the command name, not what the command would do

CVE-2026-22708 let injected text rewrite a Cursor agent's environment, so an approved "git branch" ran something else. It worked with an empty allowlist too.

Publishers:docker.com

Reality

Evidence58
Adoption45
Hype gap+18
Incentives78
Confidence55