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ChainDrop

Self-propagating npm supply-chain worm that infected 400+ packages, stole GitHub Actions OIDC tokens, and persisted via checked-in developer tool configs.

Known aliases

  • ChainDrop npm worm
  • ChainDrop / Shai-Hulud
  • ChainDrop worm

Current stories

buildConfirmed4 publishers

In Tensorlake's npm SDK 0.5.144, a preinstall hook steals credentials before any sandbox runs

Tensorlake's npm SDK 0.5.144 runs a credential-stealing worm from a preinstall hook at install time, Socket reported. According to Socket's analysis, any secret reachable from a workstation or build runner that installed the release may be exposed.

Perspective Coverage

4 publishers
Builder
Builder 44%
Operator
Operator 50%
Investor
Investor 6%

Reality

Evidence74
Adoption25
Hype gap+10
Incentives35
Confidence72
securityOne report1 publisher

Unit 42 finds supply-chain malware fetching its C2 addresses from blockchain smart contracts

Unit 42 says supply-chain attackers have moved command-and-control into blockchain smart contracts, so one transaction can re-point an entire botnet or worm. Defenders' useful choke points are now developer machines, CI runners and the chain lookup itself.

Reality

Evidence55
Adoption45
Hype gap+15
Incentives45
Confidence55
buildOne report1 publisher

ChainDrop executes from a checked-in agent config the moment a coding session starts

GitGuardian says the ChainDrop worm reached 444 npm packages by planting a SessionStart hook in Claude Code and a folderOpen task in VS Code, and the publishing credential it steals is used to republish inside the same session.

Publishers:dev.to

Reality

Evidence45
Adoption55
Hype gap+22
Incentives80
Confidence42
buildOne report1 publisher

Every one of thirteen named 2025-26 incidents ran on a credential that still worked

Anthropic, Sysdig, Unit 42 and GitGuardian describe the same shape of failure, which puts the interesting number on your side of the fence: how long an issued token keeps working after it leaves your control.

Publishers:dev.to

Reality

Evidence27
Adoption44
Hype gap+37
Incentives71
Confidence57
buildOne report1 publisher

56 build-pipeline attacks, one vendor's alert queue, and the February jump nobody can attribute yet

StepSecurity's first annual report logs 56 confirmed supply chain compromises and says plainly that these are its own alerts. The February change is the finding; explaining it is the hard part.

Publishers:runtimewire.com

Reality

Evidence46
Adoption42
Hype gap+16
Incentives79
Confidence51
securityOne report1 publisher

Reading OIDC tokens out of runner memory: ChainDrop and the poisoned build

Unit 42 says a worm hidden in more than 400 npm packages read GitHub Actions runner memory for temporary OIDC tokens. An SBOM generated at the end of the build would not have seen any of it.

Reality

Evidence55
Adoption62
Hype gap+18
Incentives80
Confidence52