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CanisterWorm

Self-propagating npm supply chain malware from the 2026 TeamPCP campaign. It steals cloud and developer credentials, with decentralized C2 and wiper components.

Current stories

securityConfirmed3 publishers

Attacker agents ran a mass credential harvest from inside the victim's own cloud in six hours

Mandiant traced the Q2 2026 campaign to an AI coding chatbot, one prompt and a set of agent instructions that ran the scanning pipeline, fixed its own errors and rotated IPs with nobody at the keyboard.

Perspective Coverage

3 publishers
Builder
Builder 30%
Operator
Operator 57%
Investor
Investor 13%

Reality

Evidence58
Adoption62
Hype gap+24
Incentives70
Confidence66
scienceOne report1 publisher

TeamPCP hid its infostealer inside the scanners that audit everyone else's code

Unit 42 says the group backdoored Trivy, KICS, LiteLLM and Telnyx's Python SDK, tools that run inside CI with the privileges needed to reach production secrets, which is also why the headline counts deserve a slow read.

Reality

Evidence55
Adoption58
Hype gap+32
Incentives78
Confidence48
scienceOne report1 publisher

A backdoored litellm release turns every CI job that installed it into a credential incident

Datadog's investigation puts genuine PyPI releases of litellm and telnyx inside the same campaign that poisoned Trivy on March 19, which makes the unit of remediation the secrets the build could see rather than the version pin.

Publishers:securitylabs.datadoghq.com

Reality

Evidence71
Adoption62
Hype gap−8
Incentives58
Confidence64
buildOne report1 publisher

56 build-pipeline attacks, one vendor's alert queue, and the February jump nobody can attribute yet

StepSecurity's first annual report logs 56 confirmed supply chain compromises and says plainly that these are its own alerts. The February change is the finding; explaining it is the hard part.

Publishers:runtimewire.com

Reality

Evidence46
Adoption42
Hype gap+16
Incentives79
Confidence51
securityOne report1 publisher

The 2,500-org compromise was a Trivy problem. LiteLLM was the closing act.

SOCRadar's record-level data puts 95 percent of identified victims before the poisoned LiteLLM packages ever hit PyPI. Anyone who rotated only what LiteLLM touched is still exposed.

Publishers:securityweek.com

Reality

Evidence52
Adoption68
Hype gap+12
Incentives66
Confidence55